development wisdom shifted away from mobilizing and guiding capital accumulation. Attention, instead, shifted toward the success of the East Asian tigers (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore), which combined export orientation and macroeconomic stability. This became the inspiration for structural adjustment packages of the IMF, the World Bank, and the "Washington Consensus," which called for removing price distortions, opening up to trade, and correcting macroeconomic imbalances (mainly budget deficits). The slogan of the new wave was "adjustment with growth."
Alas, loans to finance structural adjustment met the same fate in low-income countries as the earlier loans to finance investment-there was little or no growth; the loans could not be repaid; and the low-income debt crisis stretched out into the new millennium with every year bringing a new wave of debt forgiveness (most recently, the cancellation of the structural adjustment loans in the Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative of 2006). In the middle-income countries of Latin America, there was, for the most part, adjustment and debt repayment, but little growth compared to expectations in the 1990s. The hope that the "East Asian miracle" could be replicated elsewhere with the same policies proved illusory. The Washington Consensus then gave way to second generation reforms that stressed the importance of institutions such as property rights, contract enforcement, democratic accountability, and freedom from corruption.
Although each shift in the conventional wisdom was provoked by the failure of the previous conventional wisdom, the argument was usually that previous recommendations were "necessary but not sufficient." As Rodrik (2006) points out, this had the effect of placing all the blame on the recipient rather than on the development experts, of making the list of "sufficient conditions" for development ever longer, and of making the conventional wisdom nonfalsifiable.
A lot of these shifts were provoked by broad stylized facts and compelling country examples rather than by formal empirics. Development knowledge could draw upon more formal empirics like growth regressions. However, the hope that arose in the early 1990s that the New Growth Literature at least empirically could find the answers eventually collapsed from a surplus of answers. Steven N. Durlauf, Paul A. Johnson, and R. W. Temple (2005) pointed out that 145 different right-hand-side variables were significant as determinants of growth in various studies with around 100 degrees of freedom. When the problems of unrestricted specification were reduced by testing the outcomes of the key Washington Consensus variables on growth, the results tended to confirm the casual empiricism described above-countries as a group moved toward "better policies," yet average growth for that group declined for unknown reasons (Easterly 2001 ).
In the new millennium, a remarkably broad group of academics and policymakers seem to agree that, after all, maybe we don't know how to achieve development, although they are reluctant to say so exactly. The World Bank (2005) was either giving up or offering instantaneous nonfalsifiability: "Different policies can yield the same result, and the same policy can yield different results, depending on country institutional contexts and underlying growth strategies." The Barcelona Development Agenda (2004), a who's who of leading economists, concluded that "there is no single set of policies that can be guaranteed to ignite sustained growth. Nations that have succeeded at this tremendously important task have faced different sets of obstacles and have adopted various policies regarding regulation, export and industrial promotion, and technological innovation and knowledge acquisition."
Lindauer and Pritchett (2002) call it most honestly: "It seems harder than ever to identify the keys to growth. For every example, there is a counterexample. The current nostrum of one size doesn't fit all is not itself a big idea, but a way of expressing the absence of any big ideas."
This does not mean that economists know nothing about development, or that they know nothing about the many little pieces that contribute to development. Good economic analysis of problems in finance, macroeconomics, taxation and public spending, health, agriculture, etc. has held up well. Economists are reasonably confident that some combination of free markets and good institutions has an excellent historical track record of achieving development (as opposed to, say, totalitarian control of the economy by kleptocrats). It is just that we don't know how to get from here to there; which specific actions contribute to free markets and good institutions; how all the little pieces fit together. That is, we don't know how to achieve development.
II. Our Advice and Money Will Make Those Correct Actions Happen
Using the same judgment by stylized facts and country cases that has guided the evolution of the conventional wisdom, development assistance has failed to achieve development. Nor has there been much better news on development assistance (money cum advice) changing the policies that were supposed to raise growth according to the Washington Consensus. Easterly (2005) found that structural adjustment lending also had no effect on the kind of macro policies and price distortions that it was supposed to correct. The confidence that aid would raise growth was also naive about the knowledge and incentive problems that afflict the foreign aid agencies. Foreign aid is a public entity spending the money of rich people on the needs of poor people. Unlike most market transactions, the recipient of the aid goods has no ability to signal their dissatisfaction by discontinuing the trade of money for goods. Unlike the provision of domestic public goods in democracies, the recipient of aid-financed public services has no ability to register dissatisfaction through voting. With little or no feedback from the poor, there is little information as to which aid programs are working.
Nor is there much incentive for the aid agency to find out what works when there is little accountability (see Easterly 2006
). These problems may account for many of the more well-documented foibles of the aid system: an emphasis on loans made rather than on the results of those loans, a surplus of reports that no one reads, a fondness for grand frameworks and world summits, moral exhortations to everyone rather than any agency taking responsibility for any one thing, foreign technical experts to whom no one is listening, health clinics without medicines, schools without textbooks, roads and water systems built but not maintained, aid-financed governments that stay in power despite corruption and economic mismanagement, and so on.
Having development be the goal of development assistance made these problems regarding incentives and information worse for the aid agencies than if they had focused on more specific tasks such as combating childhood diseases, for example. With many aid agencies operating in each country, with development of that country depending on many other factors besides aid agencies, and with the inability to map actions to development anyway, it was very hard to hold an individual aid agency accountable for a good or bad development outcome. Hence, development assistance, as it is now conceived, is inherently unaccountable and unable to process feedback.
III. We Know Who "We" Are
Despite the frequency of statements like "we must end world poverty," it is seldom clarified who this "we" is that is taking responsibility for world poverty. Is it the World Bank or United Nations officials? Is it national government leaders? Is it celebrities? Perhaps "development experts" are the most likely candidates. The expert tradition is so strong that the World Bank's (2005) response to the failure of expert analysis on how to achieve development is to intensify the use of expert analysis. 
IV. Conclusion
In sum, we don't know what actions achieve development, our advice and aid do not make those actions happen even if we knew what they were, and we are not even sure who this "we" is that is supposed to achieve development. I take away from this that development assistance was a mistake.
Yet it doesn't necessarily follow that foreign aid should be eliminated. Once freed from the delusion that it can accomplish development, foreign aid could finance piecemeal steps aimed at accomplishing particular tasks for which there is clearly a huge demand-to reduce malaria deaths, to provide more clean water, to build and maintain roads, to provide scholarships for talented but poor students, and so on. It could seek to create more opportunities for poor individuals, rather than try to transform poor societies. The knowledge and incentive problems for each such focused effort seem more solvable than that of "development assistance," although not easy. As far as the experts are concerned, they would do well to remember the principles of the division of labor and gains from specialization, focusing on problems such as inflation stabilization, financial regulation, or elimination of red tape encountered by businesses. They probably have a lot to offer in those areas. Economists still have a more general role to play in making the case for individual freedoms that allow the spontaneous, bottom-up processes to work. Fortunately, the inability of the experts and the aid donors to provide the answers for development has not stopped development from "just happening" on its own. Economic growth, without much influence by experts or much contribution by foreign aid, is happening around the world in places like China, India, Chile, Botswana, Turkey, and Vietnam, generally involving homegrown, gradual movement toward freer markets. Even though some of these success stories could later flop, history suggests their place will be taken by new permanent exits from poverty. This should be enough to reassure those who care about world poverty to have some hope rather than despair.
